Tanović tackles the Bosnian war theme more directly by developing the central plot line around a trench story. Nevertheless, his film is replete with crude dark humour, reductive anti-Western sentiments and absurd situations in the director's attempt to 'treat a subject that was serious with a good sense of humour'. 6 One can then logically enquire about the validity of such treatment of a war, which has been uniformly denounced as the ugliest example of ethnic nationalism. The artistic flight into humour and parody can be interpreted as the aestheticisation of an event that demands unequivocal political commitment; moreover, the films' challenge to armed conflict approximates a kind of a universalist discourse about good and evil, essential identities and ancient animosities. On the other hand, it is equally pertinent to insist on the political viability of postmodernist parody with respect to essentialist representations of the region and its populations. 7 The refusal to 'take sides', which both films seem to advocate, then, becomes an attempt to be committed to those that are not aligned with and dangerously suspended inbetween the 'opposing camps'.
Whence the po-co-co?
The above issues remind one of the perennial tensions between postcolonial critique and postmodernist aesthetics, 'serious' political commitment and historical analysis vs. playful irony and post-ideological cynicism. This, in its turn, calls for the deciphering of the first part of my playful title: po-co-co Balkans. That representations of the Balkans by those within and those without can be read against postcolonial critique of essentialist and universalist discourses is not hard to imagine. Historian Maria Todorova introduces the term 'Balkanism', arguing that similarly to Orientalism, Balkanism is a discourse about difference as defined against the European self. However, whilst Orientalism is a discourse about imputed differences between 'types' (self vs. other), Balkanism is a discourse about imputed differences within 'one type' (self vs. not-quite-self). In this sense, the Balkans are constructed in the European (read 'Western') imaginary not as the irreducibly different 'other', but as 'an incomplete self,' almost the same but not quite. This precarious hybridity of the region has competed against celebratory, but equally problematic, metaphors of the Balkans as the bridge between 'East' and 'West' and the meeting ground of three of the world's major religions. She summarises:
By being geographically inextricable from Europe, yet culturally constructed as 'the other' within, the Balkans have been able to absorb conveniently a number of externalized political, ideological, and cultural frustrations stemming from tensions and contradictions inherent to the regions and societies outside the Balkans. Balkanism became, in time, a convenient substitute for the emotional discharge that orientalism provided, exempting the West from charges of racism, colonialism, eurocentrism and Christian intolerance against Islam. After all, the Balkans are in Europe; they are white; they are predominantly Christian, and therefore the externalization of frustrations on them can circumvent the usual racial or religious bias allegations. As in the case of the Orient, the Balkans have served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the 'European' and the 'West' has been constructed. With the re-emergence of East and orientalism as independent semantic values, the Balkans are left in Europe's thrall, anticivilization, alter ego, the dark side within. more so in the case of the Ottoman one, the newly independent nation-states inherited most of the socio-political set-up of the former imperial entity. In contrast, the dissolution of external colonial empires took place after the Second World War and the resulting independent states had to come to terms with the rupture in the political and cultural continuity that the colonial intervention had brought about. Snow beat upon the window. Black ignite fumes rose from the brick and scrap-iron chimneys.
The earth here had the harsh, exhausted face of a prostitute, cursing bitterly between coughs.
The landscape of atrocities is easy to recognize: Communism had been the Great Preserver. In the post-Cold War world, multiple communal conflicts have superseded the single superpower conflict. When these communal conflicts involve groups from different civilizations, they tend to expand and to escalate. As the conflict becomes more intense, each side attempts to rally support from countries and groups belonging to its civilization.… The longer a fault line conflict continues the more kin countries are likely to become involved in supporting, constraining, and mediating roles. As a result of this 'kin-country-syndrome', fault line conflicts have a much higher potential for escalation than do intracivilizational conflicts and usually require intercivilizational cooperation to contain and end them. 22 Pronouncing the Cold War experiment of ideological 'cross-civilisational' alignment as unsuccessful, Huntington insists on the strength of ethnic kinship relations in determining a country's or a region's policy. All the more so in fault-line situations as the one in the Balkans, where a cluster of failed communist states of mixed ethnic populations became inevitably drawn into an escalating conflict aiming for civilisational purity. Whilst his argument purportedly relies on historical specificity, it smacks of rigid ethnic (and religious)
identitarianism, devoid of any subtle cross-referencing with the current socio-economic, political, demographic and discursive situation.
How do Kusturica and Tanović tackle the Balkan theme in their works? As already mentioned, both films abound in staple Balkanist imagery centred round the 'Balkan war' of the 1990s. However, it is my contention that by invoking and actively using flagrant Balkanist discourse the two films destabilise it and point at its internal contradictions. Whilst the drive for internal demarcation, division, and exclusion underlying identitarian and nationalist thought has been ascribed a crucial role in the armed conflict in the multi-ethnic state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and by extension to the Balkans, thus becoming a powerful metaphor in Balkanist discourse, the two films suggest that such a stance is highly equivocal. The stringent identitarianism pervading such conceptualisations is re-enacted in both films in a centrifugal move towards recharted ethnic and national belonging. Concomitantly, however, there is a centripetal move towards the personalisation of the conflict, which unfolds within more The rage that such betrayal seems to inspire can of course be extended to masses who may not have been intimates, and thus it can and does become increasingly mechanical and impersonal, but … it remains animated by a perceived violation of the sense of knowing who the Other was and of rage about who they really turn out to be. This sense of treachery, of betrayal, and thus of violated trust, rage, and hatred has everything to do with a world in which large-scale identities forcibly enter the local imagination and become dominant voice-overs in the traffic of ordinary lives. that in addition to all the assaults on his body by enemy fire and mines, he has to endure being in the limelight, whilst no one is interested in his well-being. In a countermove to the media interest in him as a spectacle, the camera at the end of the film pulls back, leaving Cera spread-eagled on the mine and stripping him of the objectifying halo of a media-generated war image. Muslims that fuels the ongoing war but the interests behind freight trains of oil and cigarettes, the political structures that lobby for them, and the propaganda machine that is set in motion.
The excruciating pressure exercised by macropolitically defined identity somewhat unexpectedly surfaces in the lecture that the Serbian captain Aleksić gives to Luka, who, distraught and desperate after his son's capture, volunteers to be exchanged for Miloš :
Aleksić: Remember, this isn't your private war.
Luka: I can't take it any more. I'll kill myself. 
